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Resolving Still Unresolved Issues 
of Bankruptcy Law: 
A Fence or An Ambulance 
by 
Paul M. Baisier 
and 
David G. Epstein* 
Seventeen years after the enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 
1978, many basic questions of substantive bankruptcy law remain unanswered. 
Stated differently, in the past seventeen years, many basic questions of sub-
stantive bankruptcy law have been answered differently by different lower 
courts. The existing structure for the appeal of bankruptcy decisions is respon-
sible, at least in part, for the lack of clear, settled rules in many basic areas of 
substantive bankruptcy law. 
Congress established a Bankruptcy Review Commission ("'Commission") 
when it enacted the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994.1 Although the Commis-
sion is empowered to review the Bankruptcy Code and make recommendations 
based upon its findings and conclusions, its focus is directed toward making 
suggestions that do not disturb the fundamental principles and balance of cur-
rent law.2 Instead, the stated purposes of the Commission are: 
( 1) to investigate and study issues and problems relating to title 
11, United States Code (commonly known as the "'Bankruptcy 
Code"); 
(2) to evaluate the advisability of proposals and current arrange-
ments with respect to such issues and problems; 
*The authors practice in the Bankruptcy and Commercial Litigation Group at King & Spalding, At-
lanta, Georgia. The topic addressed in this Article is a continually evolving one. The information con-
tained herein is current as of early October, 1995. 
1Pub. Law No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.) 
[hereinafter the ~1994 Amendments~]. 
2H.R. REP.No.103-835, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 59 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. 3340, 3368. 
The section-by-section analysis to the 1994 Amendments indicates that: 
Id. 
The Commission is empowered to review the Bankruptcy Code and to prepare a 
report based upon its fmdings and opinions. Although no exclusive list is set forth, 
the Commission should be aware that Congress is generally satisfied with the basic 
framework established in the current Bankruptcy Code. Therefore, the work of the 
Commission should be based upon reviewing, improving, and updating the Code in 
ways which do not disturb the fundamental tenets and balance of current law. 
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(3) to prepare and submit to the Congress, the Chief]ustice, 
and the President a report in accordance with section 608 [of 
the 1994 Amendments]; and 
( 4) to solicit divergent views of all parties concerned with the 
operation of the bankruptcy system.3 
The authors urge the Commission to consider the problem presented by 
the many unsettled basic questions of substantive bankruptcy law and poten-
tial solutions to that problem that involve systemic changes to the existing 
bankruptcy appeals process. The problem, and the possible solutions, are easy 
to identify and easy to understand. The problem can be seen in any issue of the 
West's Ban~ruptcy Reporter, and the possible solutions can be found, albeit 
indirectly, in "A Fence or an Ambulance,"4 a poem read to third-graders in 
Temple, Texas in the 1950's. 
I. THE DANGEROUS CLIFF 
'fWAS A DANGEROUS CLIFF, as they freely confessed, 
'Though to wal~ near its crest was so pleasant; 
But over its terrible edge there had slipped 
A du~e and full many a peasant. 
So the people said something would have to be done, 
But their projects did not at all tally; 
Some said, "Put a fence around the edge of the cliff," 
Some, "An ambulance down in the valley." 5 
A. LACK OF SETTLED RULES 
Fifty-two times a year, bankruptcy judges and bankruptcy lawyers receive 
the green, paperback West's Ban~ruptcy Reporter. Each week it contains forty 
to fifty new bankruptcy opinions. In the issues of West's Ban~ruptcy Reporter 
(and in the other unofficial bankruptcy case reporting services), a resourceful 
lawyer can easily find persuasive precedent on either side of virtually every 
issue that arises in a bankruptcy case. 
That same resourceful lawyer will also find in West's Banl{Tuptcy Reporter 
short articles that list conflicting decisions on basic bankruptcy law issues. For 
example, the July 5, 1995, issue of West's Ban~ruptcy Reporter includes a two-
page article addressing whether a Chapter 11 debtor may propose a plan of 
reorganization which classifies an undersecured secured creditor's unsecured 
deficiency claim separately from other general unsecured claims.6 The classifi-
'Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 603, 108 Stat. 4106, 4147. 
4]0SEPH MALINS, THE RECITER 273 (1895), reprinted in HAZEL FELLEMEN, BEST LOVED POEMS OF THE 
AMERICAN PEOPLE 273 ( 1936). This poem was not read to third graders in Rochester, Illinois in the l 970's. 
'Id. 
6West"s Ban~ruptcy "Newsletter, at 2, 162 B.R., no. 27. 
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cation issue is a basic one that arises in virtually every Chapter 11 case in 
which real estate is a significant asset.7 The article lists the seven bankruptcy 
court decisions, one district court decision, and one court of appeals decision 
since 1993 that have either allowed or required separate classification of a 
secured creditor's unsecured deficiency claim, and five bankruptcy court deci-
sions, one district court decision, five court of appeals decisions, and two bank-
ruptcy appellate panel decisions since 1991 that have prohibited the separate 
classification of such a deficiency claim. In other words, seventeen years after 
the enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, there is substantial 
support in the decided case law for either position, and six of eleven judicial 
circuits have no binding precedent on this most basic question of substantive 
bankruptcy law.8 
This conflict and lack of direction in the reported case law has consider-
able practical impact. Attorneys representing both debtors and creditors in 
the six circuits without binding precedent (and with significant authority on 
both sides) can and do litigate the same basic issue again and again and again.9 
71n a typical bankruptcy case where one of the assets of the estate is an improved piece of commercial 
real estate, financed to a substantial extent by a lender, the value of the real estate and the nature arid 
extent of the resulting claims of the lender are invariably at issue. If the property has a value less than the 
amount of the associated loan (as it often does), the lender has a secured claim for the value of the property 
and an unsecured claim for the balance. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1994). Often, the unsecured claim of the lender 
is large and will dominate the class of general unsecured creditors for voting purposes, see id. § 1126, if it 
is included therein. Such domination of the unsecured creditor class would provide the lender with sub· 
stantial leverage in the bankruptcy case, particularly where the debtor would otherwise rely on the unse· 
cured creditor class to provide it with its needed accepting impaired class, see id. § l 129(a)(l0). To avoid 
allowing the lender to have that leverage, the debtor often attempts to put the lender's unsecured defi· 
ciency claim in a separate class. This creates interpretive problems with the classification requirements, 
see id. § 1122. Whether such a classification is permissible has divided the courts. Compare, e.g., In re 
Woodbrook Assocs., 19 F.3d 312 (7th Cir. 1994), with RTC v. Swedeland Dev. Group, Inc. (In re Swedeland 
Dev. Group, Inc.), 16 F.3d 552 (3d Cir. 1994). See generally Bruce A. Markell, Clueless on Classification: 
'Toward Removing Artificial Limits on Chapter 11 Claim Classification, 11 BANKR. DEV. J. 1 (1994-95); 
Scott F. Norberg, Classification of Claims Under Chapter 11 of the Banl{ruptcy Code: The Fallacy of 
Interest Based Classification, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 119 (1995). 
8Two of the five courts of appeals decisions allowing separate classification are from the Third Circuit; 
hence there are six circuits without binding precedent, rather than five. 
9This is only one of numerous questions that lawyers can and do litigate again and again. Currently, 
lawyers are litigating and relitigating questions such as: if§ 553 mutuality exists for claims by and against 
different government agencies, compare Westamerica Bank v. United States, 178 B.R. 493 (Bankr. N.D. 
Cal. 1995) (no mutuality), with United States v. Reed (In re Reed), 179 B.R. 353 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1995) 
(mutuality); whether Chapter 12 debtors can avoid trustee's fees by making direct payments to creditors, 
compare Michael v. Beard (In re Beard), 45 F.3d 113 (6th Cir. 1995); Wagner v. Armstrong (In re Wagner), 
36 F.3d (8th Cir. 1994); In re Cross, 182 B.R. 42 (D. Neb. 1995) (permitted), with Dunivent v. Schollett 
(In re Schollett), 980 F.2d 639 (10th Cir. 1992); Fulkrod v. Anabele Savage (In re Fulkrod), 973 F.2d 801 
(9th Cir. 1992); In re CA. Jackson Ranch Co., 181 B.R. 552 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1995) (prohibited); see 
generally George H. Singer, Zeroing Out the Standing Trustee's Percentage Fee: The Eighth Circuit Ap· 
proves "Outside the Plan" Payments for Chapter 12 Debtors, 11 NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER 7 (Nov. 1994) 
(for a comprehensive analysis of the issue); and when lease rejection is effective, compare In re Thinking 
Machs. Corp., 67 F.3d 1021 (1st Cir. 1995); In re 1 Potato 2, Inc., 182 B.R. 540 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1995) (on 
court approval), with In re 1Potato2, Inc., 58 B.R. 752 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986) (on filing of motion to reject). 
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By contrast, if a debtor's attorney knew that an unsecured deficiency claim 
could not be classified separately from the debtor's other general unsecured 
claims, counsel might well advise the debtor to negotiate a consensual resolu-
tion with the secured creditor rather than to file for bankruptcy and litigate. 
Similarly, if the attorney representing the secured creditor knew that a debtor 
could classify a secured creditor's unsecured deficiency claim separately from 
its other general unsecured claims, counsel would likely advise his or her client 
to negotiate a consensual resolution with the potential debtor rather than push 
that potential debtor into bankruptcy. With the existing uncertainty, each 
side believes that it might prevail, and litigation, rather than meaningful busi-
ness negotiation, is often the chosen course of action. 
As is evident, both debtors and creditors would benefit from the definitive 
resolution of basic legal issues and the conclusive establishment oflegally bind-
ing rules. The relitigation of basic questions of substantive bankruptcy law is 
grossly inefficient and compounds the expense and delay inherent in the bank-
ruptcy process. In one of the many decisions on the separate classification of 
unsecured deficiency claims issue, Life Insurance Co. v. Bara~at (In re Bara~at), 10 
United States Bankruptcy Judge Geraldine Mund acknowledges that "wide 
gaps exist in the areas of settled law"11 which create "an inefficient and ineffec-
tive situation."12 Judge Mund attributes that situation to the present bank-
ruptcy appellate process.13 The authors agree. 
B. BANKRUPTCY APPEALS PROCESS 
The initial appeal of a decision by a bankruptcy court can be made either 
to an Article III district court or an Article I bankruptcy appellate panel, 14 
provided that the circuit in which the appeal arises has established a bank-
ruptcy appellate panel. To date, only the Ninth Circuit has established and 
retained15 a bankruptcy appellate panel.16 
1. District Court Appeals 
Outside of the Ninth Circuit, bankruptcy appeals have to date been routed 
exclusively to the district courts. There are 94 district courts and approxi-
10173 B.R. 672 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1994). 
"Id. at 680. 
12Id. 
"Id. 
1
•23 U.S.C. § 158 (1994). The bankruptcy appellate process is based in the Article I status of bank-
ruptcy courts. The problems with the bankruptcy appellate process have the same basis. See generally 
Frank R. Kennedy, 'The Banl{Tuptcy Court and I ts jurisdiction, NORTON ANNUAL SURVEY OF BANKR. L. 485 
(1995). Nevertheless, on September 19, 1995, the Judicial Conference of the United States ~deleted from 
its Proposed Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts a recommendation that Article III status for bank-
ruptcy courts be considered.~ BJ-iA Banl{Tuptcy Law Daily, September 29, 1995. See infra notes 39-54 and 
accompanying text (for a discussion of the Proposed Long Range Plan). 
"The First Circuit had a Bankruptcy Appellate Panel. It was dissolved in 1984. 
16As discussed in greater detail infra notes 20-22 and accompanying text, Congress called for the other 
courts of appeals to consider establishing a bankruptcy appellate panel in § 104 of the 1994 Amendments. 
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mately 650 district judges. None of the district judges is bound by a bank-
ruptcy appeals decision of a district judge from one of the other 93 district 
courts.17 For example, a district judge in the Northern District of Georgia is 
not bound by the bankruptcy appeals decisions of a district judge in the South-
ern District of New York, or by a bankruptcy appeals decision of a district 
judge in the Southern District of Georgia. Further, district judges in multi-
judge districts are not even bound by the bankruptcy appeals decisions of other 
judges from that same district.18 Indeed, there are reported cases holding that a 
bankruptcy judge is not even bound by the bankruptcy appeals decision of one 
of the district judges in his or her own district, if that district is a multi-judge 
district.19 The number of district courts and the number of district judges, 
combined with the lack of precedential effect generally given to the decision of 
one district judge in the subsequent decisions of district judges (and bankruptcy 
judges), significantly limits the precedential effect of the bankruptcy appeals 
decisions of any of the district judges. 
2. Ban~ruptcy Appellate Panel Appeals 
In the Ninth Circuit, the appeal of a bankruptcy court decision may be had 
before either a district court or a bankruptcy appellate panel. The Ninth Cir-
cuit has had a bankruptcy appellate panel since 1979.20 In the 1994 Amend-
ments, Congress required the other circuits to establish a bankruptcy appellate 
panel, absent a finding by the judicial council for that circuit that either (i) there are 
insufficient bankruptcy judges in the circuit to do so, or (ii) the establishment of 
a bankruptcy appellate panel would result in undue delay or increased costs.21 
There is no statutory deadline for the other circuits to establish a bankruptcy 
17See generally Note, Banl(ruptcy Courts and Stare Decisis: 'The N.eed for Restructuring,_27 MICH. J. L. 
REP. 313 (1994); lB ]AMES w. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 11 .402[1], at 1-14 & n. 20 (2d 
ed. 1995) eThe district courts, like courts of appeals, owe no obedience to the decisions of their counter-
parts in other districts .... ~). 
18Compare Gumpert v. Growth Fin. Corp., 121 B.R. 837, 839 (C.D. Cal. 1990), with Miller v. Baron 
(In re Great Am. Mfg. & Sales, Inc.), 129 B.R. 633, 635 (C.D. Cal. 1990). 
19E.g.,In re Shattuc Cable Corp., 138 B.R. 557, 565 (Bankr. N.D. 111.1992); First of Am. Bank v. Gaylor 
(In re Gaylor), 123 B.R. 236, 241 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1991). For an in-depth and thoughtful look at 
precedential value and bankruptcy appeals, including cases in which bankruptcy judges have refused to 
follow the prior decisions of district judges in their district, see Daniel J. Busse!, Power, Authority, and 
Precedent in Interpreting the Banl(roptcy Code, 41 UCLA L. REv. 1063 (1994). 
:wsee generally Gordon Bermant & Judy B. Sloan, Banl(roptcy Appellate Panels: 'The N.inth Circuit's 
Experience, 21 Aruz. ST. LJ. 181 (1989). 
21Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 104(c), 108 Stat. 4109-10 (amending 28 
U.S.C. § 158). Section 28 U.S.C. § 158 provides in part: 
(b)(l) The judicial council of a circuit shall establish a bankruptcy appellate panel 
service composed of bankruptcy judges of the districts in the circuit who are ap-
pointed by the judicial council ... , to hear and determine, with the consent of all 
the parties, appeals ... unless the judicial council finds that-
(A) there are insufficient judicial resources available in the circuit; or 
(B) establishment of such service would result in undue delay or increased cost 
to parties in cases under title 11. 
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appellate panel or to find that they are unable to do so. None of the other circuits 
has yet taken any definitive action on whether or when to establish a bank-
ruptcy appellate panel in their circuit.22 
Not later than 90 days after making the finding, the judicial council shall submit to 
the Judicial Conference of the United States a report containing the factual basis of 
such finding. 
(2)(A) A judicial council may reconsider, at any time, the finding described in 
paragrap)l (1). 
(3) Bankruptcy judges appointed under paragraph (1) shall be appointed and be 
reappointed under such paragraph. 
(4) If authorized by the Judicial Conference of the United States, the judicial 
councils of 2 or more circuits may establish a joint bankruptcy appellate panel com-
prised of bankruptcy judges from the districts within the circuits for which such 
panel is established, to hear and determine, upon the consent of all the parties, ap· 
peals !lnder subsection (a) of this section. 
(5) An appeal to be heard under this subsection shall be heard by a panel of 3 
members of the bankruptcy appellate panel service, except that a member of such 
service may not hear an appeal originating in the district for which such member is 
appointed or designated under section 152 of this title. 
( 6) Appeals may not be heard under this subsection by a panel of the bankruptcy 
appellate panel service unless the district judges for the district in which the ap· 
peals occur, by majority vote, have authorized such service to hear and determine 
appeals originating in such district. 
(c)(l) Subject to subsection (b), each appeal ... shall be heard by a 3-judge panel of 
the bankruptcy appellate panel service established under subsection (b)(l) unless-
(A) the appellant elects at the time of filing the appeal; or 
(B) any other party elects, not later than 30 days after service of notice of the 
appeal; 
to have such appeal heard by the district court. 
28 U.S.C. § 158 (1994). See FED. R. BANKR. P. 800l(e). 
22It has been reported that: 
Almost half of the judicial districts may soon establish bankruptcy appellate panels 
pursuant to the 1994 Bankruptcy Reform Act, according to a poll taken by Chief 
Bankruptcy Judge David A. Scholl of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The act 
authorizes each circuit to establish a BAP unless there are insufficient judicial re-
sources in the circuit or establishing the panel would result in undue delay or in· 
creased costs to parties. Scholl spoke at a seminar session on ~Major Changes in the 
New Bankruptcy Act.~ Scholl reported that the First Circuit is ~chugging ahead~ 
with plans to establish a BAP, but it needs money. The Second Circuit apparently 
intends to implement a BAP only for the District of Connecticut, Scholl said, not• 
ing that the legislation permits judicial districts to opt out of the panel. The Third 
Circuit will meet soon to decide the issue; it appears that New Jersey is the only 
district interested in having a BAP, so the circuit may create a BAP only to hear 
New Jersey appeals, Scholl said. The Fourth Circuit has not decided whether to 
create a BAP, and the Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits are considered unlikely 
to do so, Scholl continued. The Sixth and Eighth Circuits are ~likely~ to implement 
BAPs, and the Tenth Circuit may do so with Colorado opting out. There is only 
one bankruptcy judge in the D.C. Circuit, Scholl noted. 
BNA Banl{ruptcy Law Daily, September 27, 1995. On October 18, 1995, the Circuit Council for the 
Eighth Circuit voted 9-3 to establish a bankruptcy appellate panel. The establishment of a BAP in the 
Eighth Circuit is, however, subject to the availability of funding. 
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Whatever arguments can be made in support of the creation of a bankruptcy 
appellate panel, the development of binding precedent is not one of them. Look-
ing to the experience of the Ninth Circuit, the precedential effect of a decision 
of a bankruptcy appellate panel is problematic for at least the following reasons: 
1. The Ninth Circuit has held that the decisions of its bank-
ruptcy appellate panel are not binding on the district courts 
in the Ninth Circuit because Article III district court judges 
cannot constitutionally be bound by the decisions of the 
Article I bankruptcy court judges who sit on a bankruptcy 
appellate panel under 28 U.S.C. § 158(b);23 
2. Since a bankruptcy appellate panel sits in lieu of a district 
court, its opinions may only have stare decisis effect within 
the district from which the appeal was taken; ' 
3. If, as suggested above, district court opinions do not bind the 
bankruptcy courts sitting in the same district, then the opin-
ions of the bankruptcy appellate panel (which sits in lieu of 
the district court) cannot bind those same bankruptcy courts, 
and thus bind no one; and 
4. A bankruptcy appellate panel may not have the power to 
set precedent at all because it is an Article I court and, as 
such, has authority only to the extent that the parties consent 
to be bound by it.24 
In sum, it is arguable that the result of an appeal from the bankruptcy 
court to a district court is an opinion that is binding precedent only on parties 
to the appeal and on future parties that draw that same district judge for the 
appeal of the same issue. Even stronger arguments can be made against any 
stare decisis effect at all for the opinion of a bankruptcy appellate panel. 
3. Appeals to the Court of Appeals 
If the opinion of the district court or bankruptcy appellate panel is a "final 
order,"25 is not "moot,"26 and if the parties have sufficient funds and time, fur-
23See Bank of Maui v. Estate Analysis, Inc., 908 F.2d 470 (9th Cir. 1990). See generally Evan H. Camiker, 
Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedent, 46 STAN. L. REv. 817 (1994); Honorable Kathleen 
P. March & Rigoberto Obregon, Are BAP Decisions Binding on Any Court?, 18 CAL. BANKR.J. 189 (1990); 
Rigoberto V. Obregon, In re Globe Illumination: A Provocative But Flawed Theory on the Precedential 
Value of BAP Authority, 21 CAL. BANKR.]. 45 (1983). 
24See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1994) (allowing parties to the appeal to opt out of having an appeal 
heard by a bankruptcy appellate panel). See supra note 21. 
25For discussion and criticism of the ~final order~ requirement, see STEPHEN E. SNYDER & LAWRENCE 
PONOROFI', COMMERCIAL BANKRUPTCY LITIGATION§ 4.01 (1989); Richard B. Levin, Banl{ruptcy Appeals, 
58 N.C. L. REv. 968, 982-92 (1980). 
26See Bussell, supra note 19, at 1070 (for a discussion of the problems presented by the mootness 
doctrine in the context of bankruptcy). 
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ther appeal to the court of appeals can be had.27 The statutory requirement of 
a final order and the bar of mootness, coupled with the practical requirements 
of time and money, significantly limit the number of bankruptcy court deci-
sions subjected to a second-tier appeal to a court of appeals. A 1993 Federal 
Judicial Center study estimates that less than one out of every five bankruptcy 
appeals to the district court ultimately reaches a court of appeals.28 
The time required to complete an appeal to a district court or bankruptcy 
appellate panel and then to a court of appeals is especially troublesome in the 
instance of a bankruptcy court decision that has broad commercial effect. For 
example, the bankruptcy court decisions in 'Twist Cap, Inc. v. Southeast Ban~ 
(In re 'Twist Cap) 29 and Prime Motor Inns, Inc. v. First Fidelity Ban~ (In re 
Prime Motors Inns, Inc.),30 which restrained the post-bankruptcy collection on 
letters of credit, affected the issuance of the billions of dollars of credit backed 
by letters of credit. Similarly, the decision in In re Standard Brands Paint Com-
pany,31 which lowered the threshold for substantive consolidation and allowed 
such consolidation upon consent of the "major parties," impacted substantive 
consolidation opinions in transactions aggregating billions of dollars. More re-
cently, the bankruptcy court opinion in In re Harborview Development 1986 
Limited Partnership,32 which held, in effect, that the right to possession was 
the only right protected under 11 U.S.C. § 365(h), was undoubtedly consid-
ered by lenders in deciding whether to engage in commercial real estate 
financings secured by ground leases. 
II. THE AMBULANCE 
But the cry for the ambulance carried the day, 
For it spread through the neighboring city; 
A fence may be useful or not, it is true, 
But each heart became brimful of pity 
For those who slipped over that dangerous cliff; 
And.the dwellers in highway and alley 
Gave pounds or gave pence, not to put up a fence, 
But an ambulance down in the valley. 
"For the cliff is all right, if you're careful," they said, 
"And, if fol~s even slip and are dropping, 
It isn't the slipping that hurts them so much, 
2728 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994). Section 158(d) provides that: ~The courts of appeals shall have jurisdic· 
tion of appeals from all final decisions, judgments, orders, and decrees ... . ~Id. 
28Fletcher Magnum, Memorandum to 'fhe Long Range Planning Committee of 'fhe Federal Judicial 
Center 19 (December 23, 1993). 
291 B.R. 284 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1979). 
30123 B.R. 104 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1990). 
31 154 B.R. 563 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1993). 
32152 B.R. 897 (D.S.C. 1993). 
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As the shoe~ down below when they're stopping." 
So day after day, as these mishaps occurred, 
~uic~forth would these rescuers sally 
'To pie~ up the victims who fell off the cliff, 
With their ambulance down in the valley.33 
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To date, the primary solution to the problem of unresolved issues of basic 
substantive bankruptcy law has been congressional legislation. The 1994 
Amendments "'fixed" the problem that the bankruptcy court opinion in 
Harborview created for the commercial real estate market by legislatively over-
ruling the Harborview decision.34 Several of the other provisions of the 1994 
Amendments address problems presented by a bankruptcy court opinion or 
resolve a conflict in the opinions of various bankruptcy and other courts.35 
Congress, with the assistance of the Bankruptcy Review Commission, can 
continue to serve as the "'ambulance down in the valley."36 The Commission 
33MALINS, supra note 4. 
HBankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 205, 108 Stat. 4106, 4122-23 (amending 
11 U.S.C. § 365). The amendments to 11 U.S.C. § 365(h) allow the lessee to retain its rights not only to 
possession but to timing and amount of rent payments, to quiet enjoyment, to subletting, to assignment 
and to hypothecation. See Thomas C. Hamburger, Brian P. Gallagher & Kimberly K. Rubel, Conflict Re-
solved: Banl{ruptcy Code Section 365(h) and the Contradictory Cases Requiring its Amendment, 29 REAL 
PROP. & PROB. TR.J. 869 (1995). 
3~Examples of provisions in the 1994 Amendments which address problems resulting from an unre-
solved conflict in the case law, or from ~mistakenft decisions, include:§ 110 (whether expenses of creditors' 
committee members are reimbursable, see, e.g, Pullima, Yates & Brewster, Reimbursement of Creditors' 
Committee Members' Costs and Expenses Under Section 503(b), 94 CoM. L.J. 93 (1989)); § 112 (whether 
bankruptcy judges can conduct jury trials, compare In re United Missouri Bank, 901 F.2d 1449 (8th Cir. 
1990) (no), with Ben Cooper, Inc. v. Insurance Co. (In re Ben Cooper, Inc.), 896 F.2d 1394 (2d Cir. 1990) 
(yes)); § 214 (whether a creditor has an interest in postpetition rents, see 4 CoLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 11 
552.03, at 552-17 n.9 (Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 15th ed. 1995) (outlining the conflicting views));§ 216 
(whether the statute of limitations on avoidance actions runs from the filing of the case or the subsequent 
appointment of a trustee, see 4 CoLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 11546.02, at 546-14 n.9 (Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 
15th ed. 1995) (outlining the conflicting views));§ 401 (whether postpetition real property tax liens may foe 
notwithstanding the automatic stay, see Makoroff v. City of Lockport, 916 F.2d 890 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. 
denied, 499 U.S. 983 (1991); Lincoln Sav. Bank v. Suffolk County Treasurer (In re Parr Meadows Racing 
Ass'n, Inc.), 880 F.2d 1540 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S.1058 (1990)); and§ 402 (whether municipalities 
may ftle for Chapter 9 bankruptcy without express state authorization, compare In re City ofBridgeport, 128 
B.R. 688 (Bank. D. Conn. 1991}. with In re Carroll Township Auth., 119 B.R.61 (Bank. W.D. Pa. 1990)). 
36Arguably, the Supreme Court is also serving as ~the ambulance down in the valley.ft To the extent 
that it is, that ambulance does not appear to be picking up the most needy victims in the valley. See 
generally Robert K. Rasmussen, A Study of the Cost and Benefits of 'I'extualism: 'The Supreme Court's 
Ban~ruptcy Cases, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 535 (1993). For example, the Supreme Court has refused to review 
at least one case regarding the separate classification of an undersecured creditor's unsecured deficiency 
claim, despite its obvious importance and the split in the circuits. See, e.g., Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Greystone III Joint Venture (In re Greystone III Joint Venture), 995 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. 
denied, 113 S. Ct. 72 (1992). See also supra note 7. The High Court also took under review, but then 
declined to decide after the parties had reached a settlement, a case that would have decided the crucial 
issue of whether a debtor can retain its interests while not paying senior creditors in full by contributing 
~new value.ft See Bonner Mall Partnership v. U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. (In re Bonner Mall Partnership), 
2 F.3d 899 (9th Cir.1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 681, motion to vacate denied & dismissed as moot by 115 
S. Ct. 386 (1994). 
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can propose and Congress can enact specific answers to basic substantive bank-
ruptcy law questions not yet definitively answered.by the courts of appeals, or 
for which the definitive answers provided by the courts of appeals and the 
lower courts have conflicted. Indeed, the legislative history seems to suggest 
that Congress envisioned such a role for the Bankruptcy Review Commission.37 
It has been the experience of the authors, however, that although Congress 
makes interstitial changes to the bankruptcy laws fairly often, it does not do so 
very well, often creating more new issues than solving old ones. 
III. THE FENCE 
To rescue the fallen is good, but "tis best 
To prevent other people from falling." 
Better close up the source of temptation and crime 
Than deliver from dungeon or galley; 
Better put a strong fence round the top of the cliff 
Than an ambulance down in the valley.38 
The authors argue that the Bankruptcy Review Commission should address 
the bankruptcy appeals process and propose institutional reforms to that pro-
cess so that appeals from the decisions of the bankruptcy court result in the 
prompt and certain resolution of basic substantive bankruptcy law issues. The 
Committee on Long Range Planning for the Judicial Conference of the United 
States (the ''Judicial Conference Committee") has made a similar recommenda-
tion.39 
A. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Current Call for Further Study 
The Judicial Conference Committee's Proposed Long Range Plan for the 
Federal Courts (the ''Judicial Conference Plan"), submitted to the Judicial Con-
ference of the United States by the Judicial Conference Committee on March 
15, 1995, acknowledges that the Bankruptcy Review Commission was created 
to study bankruptcy law and states that "examination of both existing and 
possible alternative mechanisms for appellate review of bankruptcy judges' or-
ders would be a logical part of that study ."40 The Judicial Conference Commit-
tee is making its own study of appellate review of bankruptcy judges' orders.41 
37See supra note 2. ~The Blue Ribbon bankruptcy Commission established by this bill will evaluate the 
Code's deficiencies substantively and operationally, and make a recommendation to Congress for legisla· 
tive change.n 40 CONG. REC. Sl4,461 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1994) (statement of Sen. Grassley). 
>SMALINS, supra note 4. 
'"Proposed Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts, March, 1995, Committee on Long Range Planning, 
Judicial Conference of the United States, p. 46. 
•
0Id. 
<lfd. at 45. 
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2. Prior Call for Substantial Reduction in Ban~ruptcy Appeals to 
Courts of Appeals 
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A November 1994, draft of the Judicial Conference Plan proposed, in Rec-
ommendation 20, that appeals from final orders of a bankruptcy court "'con-
tinue to be reviewed by Article III district judges," with any further appeal to 
be discretionary with the court of appeals.42 Recommendation 20 appeared to 
have been based, at least in part, on unpublished Federal Judicial Center data 
complied in 1993 that compares the duration of the pendency of bankruptcy 
appeals. As the text accompanying Recommendation 20 noted, "'appeals were 
handled more expeditiously in the district courts than in the courts of appeals: 
an average of 145 days in the district court versus 245 days in the court of 
appeals."43 
It is, of course, desirable to provide an expeditious resolution of the case at 
hand, particularly for the parties to the appeal. However, the average time 
required to complete an appeal is not the only relevant criteria for assessing the 
time-effectiveness of an appellate process. An appellate court's creation of bind-
ing precedent can result in the expeditious resolution of hundreds of cases. 
Adoption of Recommendation 20 would have produced the benefit of the faster 
end of one case at the high cost of the lack of binding precedent that might 
produce a substantially faster end to hundreds of cases. 
Recommendation 20 also seemed to be inconsistent with Recommendation 19 
in the 1994 Judicial Conference Plan, which called for an appeal of the deci-
sions of Article I courts "'ordinarily" directly to the courts of appeals.44 Further, 
Recommendation 20 did not seem to take into account Recommendation 21 
in the 1994 Judicial Conference Plan, which provided that appeals from the 
civil decisions of federal magistrate judges should be only to a court of appeals, 
because an appeal to a district court from a federal magistrate judge's decision 
"'tends to undermine the perception of magistrate judges as fully capable judicial 
officers to whom the district court entrusts adjudicative functions."45 Nowhere 
in Recommendation 20 or the text supporting Recommendation 20 is it ex-
plained why an appeal from a bankruptcy judge's decision to a district court 
does not similarly "'tend to undermine the perception" of bankruptcy judges as 
"'fully capable judicial officers." 
Recommendation 20, which called for review by "'Article III judges in the 
district court," also did not seem to take into account the then recently-passed 
1994 Amendments, which provide for the formation of bankruptcy appellate 
•
2Proposed Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts, November, 1994, Committee on Long Range Plan-
ning, Judicial Conference of the United States (Draft for Public Comment) [hereinafter the ~1994 Judicial 
Conference Plan~], p. 38. 
<3Jd. 
«Jd. at 37. 
<SJd. at 38-39. 
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panels in every circuit.46 If bankruptcy appellate panels are adopted in the vari-
ous circuits, appellate review will not be "'by Article III judges," as required by 
Recommendation 20.47 
3. Change in Course 
After public hearings in Phoenix, Arizona; Washington, D.C.; and Chicago, 
Illinois, testimony regarding Recommendation 20 from Gerald Smith,48 United 
States Bankruptcy Judge Louise D. Adler, Professor Lawrence P. King,49 Robert 
B. Millner,50 Nathan B. Feinstein,51 and Robin Phelan,52 and written submissions 
from those testifying, as well as from other bankruptcy judges and lawyers, the 
Judicial Conference Committee significantly changed its position on bankruptcy 
appeals. The Judicial Conference Committee replaced the recommendations in 
the 1994 Judicial Conference Plan with the following Recommendations re-
garding the bankruptcy appeals process in the Judicial Conference Plan: 
Recommendation 22: The existing mechanism for review of 
dispositive orders of bankruptcy judges should be studied to 
determine what appellate structure will ensure prompt, inex-
pensive resolution of bankruptcy cases and-foster coherent, 
consistent development of bankruptcy precedents. 
Recommendation 23: Pending completion of the study ofbank-
ruptcy appellate structure recommended above, the dispositive 
orders of bankruptcy judges should be reviewable directly in 
the court of appeals in those cases where the parties stipulate,53 
46See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.103-394, § 104, 108 Stat. 4106, 4109-10 (amend· 
ing 28 U.S.C. § 158). See also supra note 21. 
47Because the bankruptcy appellate panel judges are Article I judges, appellate review of bankruptcy 
judges' decisions by a bankruptcy appellate panel is inconsistent not only with the language ofRecommen· 
dation 20, but also with the statement regarding the 1994 Amendments by Senator Howell Heflin in the 
October 6, 1994, Congressional Record: ~rt should be recognized that the creation of a bankruptcy appel· 
late panel service can help to establish a dependable body of case law.~ 140 CONG. REc. Sl4,463 (daily ed. 
Oct. 6, 1994 ). As long as bankruptcy judges are Article I judges, with the limitations inherent therein, an 
appellate court of bankruptcy judges like the bankruptcy appellate panels is not going to be able to ~help to 
establish a dependable body of case law.~ 
48Member, Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules; Member, Business Bankruptcy Committee, 
Business Law Section, American Bar Association; Former Deputy Director of the Staff of the Commission 
on Bankruptcy Laws. 
49Vice Chair, National Bankruptcy Conference; Charles Seligsen Professor of Law, New York Univer· 
sity School of Law. 
'"Vice Chair, American Bar Association Joint Task Force on Bankruptcy Court Structure and Insol· 
vency Process. 
"Chair, American Bar Association Joint Task Force on Bankruptcy Court Structure and Insolvency 
Process. 
52President, American Bankruptcy Institute. 
"The Committee of Bankruptcy Administration of the Judicial Conference had removed the provision 
contained in Recommendation 23 that allowed appeal ~upon the consent of the parties~ and the Judicial 
Conference approved the revised version at its meeting on September 19, 1995. 
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or the district court or bankruptcy appellate p~nel (BAP) cer-
tifies, that such review is needed immediately to establish le-
gal principles on which subsequent proceedings in the case 
may depend.54 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS OF APPEAL TO ARTICLE III JUDGE PANEL 
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Presently, in three separate articles, a distinguished professor of bankruptcy 
law, a nationally respected bankruptcy practitioner, and a United States Bank-
ruptcy Judge have also publicly recommended changes to the appeals process. 
Professor Daniel]. Busse!, Professor of Law, U.C.L.A. Law School, Nathan B. 
Feinstein of the firm of Piper & Marbury, and United States Bankruptcy Judge 
Steven W. Rhodes, each suggests that bankruptcy appeals should go directly 
to a three-judge panel of an Article III appellate court.55 For the reasons out-
lined below, the authors support that suggestion and urge both the Judicial 
Conference Committee and the Bankruptcy Review Commission to support it 
as well. 
It can be argued that the present, two-tiered system of bankruptcy appeals 
performs adequately, if slowly, the "'error correction" appellate function. But, 
as the current version of the Judicial Conference Plan notes, "'error correction" 
is only one of the functions of the federal appellate process: 
United States courts of appeals perform two primary functions, 
often described in shorthand as "'error correction" and "'law 
declaration." Review for error entails determining whether 
the first-level decision-maker applied the correct law to the 
facts of the case, and whether procedural error occurred that 
fatally tainted the process. Law declaration is the articulation of 
a rule of law; it serves to guide prospective behavior, control fu, 
ture cases, and ensure that all cases receive the same treatment.56 
As outlined above, the present bankruptcy appeals system does not perform 
adequately the "'law declaration" function. That function is an especially impor-
tant one in bankruptcy. Bankruptcy courts are this country's most significant 
HProposed Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts, September, 1995, Committee on Long Range Plan-
ning, Judicial Conference of the United States, p. 8. These Recommendations were adopted by the Ameri-
can Bar Association by resolution on August 8, 1995. 3 BANKRUPTCY LITIGATION NEWSLETTER 35 (Summer 
1995). The ABA resolution also stated that, as part of the interim solution, legislation should be enacted 
that ~make[s] decisions of each bankruptcy appellate panel binding upon all bankruptcy courts in its 
circuit, except where contrary district court authority already exists.n Id. 
55Daniel J. Busse!, Banl{ruptcy Appellate Reform: Issues and Opinions, NORTON ANNUAL SURVEY OF 
BANKR. L. 257 (1995-96); Nathan B. Feinstein, 'The Banl{ruptcy System: Proposal to Restructure the Ban~­
ruptcy Court and BanJvuptcy Appellate Processes, NORTON ANNUAL SURVEY OF BANKR. L. 517 (1995-96); 
Honorable Steven W. Rhodes, Eight Statutory Causes of Delay and Expense in Chapter 11 Cases, 67 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 287, 296 (1993). 
561995 Judicial Conference Plan, p. 39. 
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commercial courts.57 The reported decisions of bankruptcy courts have become 
the principal source of case law regarding commercial credit transactions. 
Because the commercial lending markets are national in scope, a decision by a 
bankruptcy judge in one state affects the practices of lenders not only in that 
state but throughout the country. Reforming the bankruptcy appeals process 
so that bankruptcy appeals are resolved initially by a three-judge panel of an 
Article III appellate court, with the power to bind all of the courts below it, 
will foster the development of bankruptcy precedent and will thus satisfy the 
"law declaration" function of bankruptcy appeals. 
C. SPECIALIZED APPELLATE COURT 
Both the Bussel and Feinstein articles recommend consideration of the 
possibility of routing all bankruptcy appeals to a single Article III appellate 
court, either a new United States Court of Appeals for Bankruptcy or the 
existing United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Although the 
authors join Bussel and Feinstein in urging both the Judicial Conference Com-
mittee and the Bankruptcy Review Commission to consider this possibility, 
the authors are concerned that the costs of a specialized bankruptcy appeals 
cc>urt outweigh the benefits. 
The benefits of channeling all appeals dealing with the Bankruptcy Code 
to a single court of appeals are obvious: uniformity and efficiency. Having a 
single appellate court resolve all appeals from decisions of bankruptcy courts 
(and of district courts sitting in Title 11 matters)58 is the most efficient and 
effective way of developing the needed body of substantive bankruptcy law. 
Such a specialized bankruptcy appeals court would best serve the law declara-
tion function of an appellate court. 
The current version of the Judicial Conference Plan acknowledges that 
specialized appellate courts offer the benefits of uniformity and efficiency but 
cryptically concludes that "the well-known dangers" of judicial specialization 
outweigh any such benefit.59 A recent article by Professor Thomas E. Baker, 
Professor of Law, Texas Tech University Law School, and a member of the 
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the 
United States, describes these "well-known dangers" as follows: 
The arguments raised against court specialization are really 
two. First, a specialized appellate court ... will prematurely 
end the judicial debate on any issue with its first opinion .... 
57See Honorable Nancy C. Dreher, One Judge's View of the Uniform Commercial Code in Banl{ruptcy 
Court: Why It Doesn't Work the Way You 'Thought it Would, from, Symposium: "Managing the Paper 
'Trail": Evaluating and Reforming the Article 9 Filing System, 79 MINN. L. REV. 777, 783 (~bankruptcy 
courts are the commercial courts of this country~). 
58So long as bankruptcy judges are Article I judges, district court judges will sit in some Title 11 
matters. District courts will hear some bankruptcy proceedings in the first instance and will still review 
the actions of bankruptcy judges in non-core matters. 
591995 Judicial Conference Plan, p. 41. 
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Opponents of specialization argue that there is much value in 
"'percolation" of difficult issues .... Second, there is a danger 
that specialized courts will be "'captured" by one side or an-
other. This argument dates back to the experience with the 
Commerce Court at the beginning of this century. That court 
was perceived by many as having been captured by the rail-
road interests and was soon dissolved by Congress.60 
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The authors are particularly concerned about the perception of capture. 
At present, the primary specialized court of appeals is the Federal Circuit.61 Its 
jurisdiction includes patent cases.62 The Federal Circuit has been criticized as 
being notoriously pro-patent.63 Historical problems and present attitudes sug-
gest that it is inevitable that any national bankruptcy court of appeals would 
be perceived as notoriously pro-debtor. 
CONCLUSION 
The older of the authors remembers not only the simpler days of being in 
the third grade listening to Miss Robinson read poetry but also the simpler 
days of practicing bankruptcy law in which the Collier bankruptcy treatise 
served the law declaration function.64 For all practical purposes, Collier was 
"'the law" under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. 
With all due respect to Collier, its publishers and editors, neither Collier nor 
any other treatise can now serve the law declaration function. Today, very able 
lawyers apply conflicting non-binding precedent to basic and significant bank-
ruptcy issues that arise not only in litigation but also in structuring and docu-
menting transactions, and in counseling clients regarding troubled transactions. 
As this Article and others have suggested, the present bankruptcy appel-
late system is not serving the law declaration function. We urge the Bank-
ruptcy Review Commission to consider restructuring the bankruptcy appeals 
process to allow for direct appeals to a court of appeals, so that the bankruptcy 
appeals process can better perform the law declaration function. 
Wfhomas E. Baker, Imagining the Alternative Futures of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 28 GA. L. REv. 
913, 950 (1994). 
61See generally 15A CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE§ 3903.l (1992). 
62The Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over the following subject matters: Indian claims, tax 
refund claims, military discharge claims, property taking claims, government contract claims, certain im-
port law issues, patent cases, certain trademark issues, and certain federal employee issues. See Honorable 
Sheldon Jay Plager, 'The United States Court of Appeals: 'The Federal Circuit, and the :Non-Regional Sub-
ject Matter Concept: Reflections on the Search for a Model, 39 AM. U. L. REv. 853 (1990). 
63Eric Schmitt, Judicial Shift in Patent Cases, N.Y. TIMES, January 21, 1986, p. 02. 
64C.f.JosEPH SAMET, AVAILABLE REsEARCH TOOLS FOR BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE IN PRACTICING LAW IN-
STITUTE, THE BASICS OF BANKRUPTCY AND REORGANIZATION 241 (1989) ("the bible of bankruptcy law 
under the Bankruptcy Act~). The authors are convinced that Mr. Samet would hold the same opinion as 
to the significance of Collier even if Mr. Samet were not a Collier contributing author. 

